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Background: Results-based financing (RBF) describes health system approaches addressing both service quality and
use. Effective coverage is a metric measuring progress towards universal health coverage (UHC). Although considered a
means towards achieving UHC in settings with weak health financing modalities, the impact of RBF on effective
coverage has not been explicitly studied.
Methods: Malawi introduced the Results-Based Financing For Maternal and Neonatal Health (RBF4MNH) Initiative
in 2013 to improve quality of maternal and newborn health services at emergency obstetric care facilities. Using
a quasi-experimental design, we examined the impact of the RBF4MNH on both crude and effective coverage of
pregnant women across four districts during the two years following implementation.
Results: There was no effect on crude coverage. With a larger proportion of women in intervention areas receiving
more effective care over time, the overall net increase in effective coverage was 7.1%-points (p = 0.07). The strongest
impact on effective coverage (31.0%-point increase, p = 0.02) occurred only at lower cut-off level (60% of maximum
score) of obstetric care effectiveness. Design-specific and wider health system factors likely limited the program’s
potential to produce stronger effects.
Conclusion: The RBF4MNH improved effective coverage of pregnant women and seems to be a promising
reform approach towards reaching UHC. Given the short study period, the full potential of the current RBF
scheme has likely not yet been reached.
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Universal health coverage (UHC) aims to ensure access
to needed services of sufficient quality for everyone
without suffering financial hardship [1]. Health financing
reforms are one means towards reaching this aim in the
most efficient and sustainable way. Results-based financing
(RBF) is one of several health financing reforms currently
implemented in a number of low- and middle-income
countries (LMIC) [2]. RBF is considered a form of stra-
tegic purchasing that reimburses healthcare providers (i.e.* Correspondence: stephan.brenner@uni-heidelberg.de
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outputs [3]. RBF schemes can also include demand-side
components related to population coverage (e.g. vouchers,
conditional cash transfers) to further complement service
supply [4].
While many LMIC have introduced RBF to improve
coverage and quality of maternal and childcare service
provision, recent evidence points at the existence of
mixed results when evaluating RBF programs, with both
quantity and quality indicators responding differently in
different contexts [5, 6]. RBF programs are rather com-
plex health financing interventions in terms of their
expected theory of change (i.e. use of financial incentives
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quantity and quality of healthcare services used by the
targeted population). To reflect this complexity, RBF
evaluations often assess impact along a number of differ-
ent dimensions (i.e. health worker motivation, quality of
care, service use, crude population coverage) [7–10].
Given RBF programs’ theoretical impact on both service
quality and population coverage, approaches measuring
aggregated outcomes that frame broader concepts might
be useful adjuncts in gaining additional understanding of
the role RBF plays in the achievement of UHC.
To assess achievements towards UHC, effective cover-
age (i.e. the proportion of a population in need of care
who receive services of sufficient quality) has been sug-
gested as a suitable measure in the evaluation and mon-
itoring of health system interventions [11]. Effective
coverage differs from the commonly used measure of
crude or contact coverage (i.e. the proportion of a popu-
lation in need of care able to access a service) in also
accounting for the expected or actual effectiveness of
received care necessary to produce a desired health out-
come [12]. While increasingly applied to both general
or impact assessments of maternal and child health
programs in LMIC [13–15], the use of effective cover-
age in the evaluation of health financing interventions,
such as RBF, has so far not been reported.
Given that the wider focus of RBF programs is not only
intervening with health care supply, but also – directly or
indirectly – with demand of services and the health sys-
tem in general [16], the theory of change of RBF closely
represents the UHC idea of service coverage (i.e. people in
need receive essential health services of sufficient quality)
[17]. The aim of this study was therefore to examine the
impact of an RBF scheme in Malawi on effective coverage
in relation to the provision of facility-based obstetric care
services and to gain further insight in the role PBF can
play in achieving UHC.
Methods
Study setting
At the time the intervention was designed, mortality of
mothers in Malawi was high (maternal mortality ratio
in 2013: 636 deaths/100,000 live births for Malawi vs.
210 deaths/100,000 live births globally; newborn mor-
tality rate in 2013: 25.9 deaths/1000 live births in
Malawi vs. 20.1 deaths/1000 live births globally) [18,
19]. Obstetric care is offered free of charge through
public and contracted not-for-profit health facilities
[20]. Yet, 75% of all pregnant women with obstetric
complications do not actually receive satisfactory emer-
gency obstetric care (EmOC) [21]. Salaries of publicly
employed health workers stem directly from central
government budgets, while publicly funded primary
care facilities (i.e. health centres and district-levelhospitals) receive a mix of financial allocations from
both central and local government budgets. Malawi’s
health system is further challenged by chronic health
worker shortages and system-wide stock-outs of essen-
tial drugs and supplies [22].
Intervention
The Malawi Ministry of Health (MoH) introduced the
Results-Based Financing For Maternal And Neonatal
Health (RBF4MNH) Initiative to four districts (Balaka,
Dedza, Mchinji, Ntcheu) in April 2013 to enhance ob-
stetric care provision at facilities designated to eventually
fully function as EmOC centres. Together, these four
districts consist of a total of 33 designated EmOC facil-
ities serving a catchment population with an expected
birth rate of about 111,450 deliveries per year [21]. Dis-
trict selection was driven by MoH decisions to avoid
overlap with other existing or upcoming maternal health
or health financing programs in the country. The
RBF4MNH’s main objective is to improve both quality
and access to facility-based obstetric care for women
and newborns during birth and up to 48 h after delivery
[23] through a combination of supply- (performance--
based payments to facilities and district health manage-
ment teams (DHMT)) and demand-side mechanisms
(conditional cash transfers (CCT) to pregnant women
within catchment areas). Implementation occurred in
two phases: an early pilot phase (April 2013 to October
2014) and a later expansion phase (November 2014 on-
wards). During the early phase, only 18 out of the 33
EmOC facilities (four hospitals, 14 health centres) were
empanelled and later expanded by an additional 10 facil-
ities (two community hospitals, eight health centres)
with on-going plans for a nation-wide scale-up. Empa-
neled facilities were selected based on the presence of at
least four skilled birth attendants, catchment population
size, and number of institutional deliveries.
Upon verification, facilities receive payments for
achieving a set of performance targets related to qual-
ity of clinical care as well as general service improve-
ment performance indicators [see Additional file 1].
Of these rewards, 40% are earmarked for further in-
vestments improving structural working conditions,
60% for individual bonus payments to health workers
and auxiliary staff (about 15–25% of staff ’s baseline
salary). DHMT receive payments related to perform-
ance indicators on effective management and support
of the entire district [see Additional file 1), also di-
vided into an investment and bonus portion. CCT por-
tions to women were calculated to defray upfront
costs related to childbirth (i.e. transportation, basic
childbirth items, stay in maternal waiting home) and
average opportunity costs anticipated by an average
poor patient or her family in Malawi during a 48-h
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woman is about seven Euros. To ensure minimum
standards in EmOC delivery, all RBF facilities received
some basic infrastructure and/or equipment support
(e.g. delivery beds, essential examination, EmOC and
sterilization material, renovation or reconstruction of
labour rooms, postpartum wards, maternal waiting
homes, electricity and water supply) prior to interven-
tion launch.
The early implementation phase consisted of three
six-month reward cycles and served as an opportunity
for implementers to further fine-tune the intervention in
response to unforeseen challenges. Feedback and experi-
ences gained during these initial cycles resulted in some
programmatic adjustments prior to its expansion in Oc-
tober 2014, including:
 Performance verification using reciprocal peer-
review between districts assigned to an external
third party auditor to avoid negative sentiments be-
tween peers.
 ‘Target-based’ (i.e. all-or-nothing) calculation of re-
wards changed to ‘proportion-based’ (i.e. relative to
progress) to increase motivation towards attainment
of more challenging targets.
 Reward cycles reduced from six to three months to
increase motivation linking performance and
rewards over shorter time intervals.
 With the demand-side CCT component requiring
facilities to directly keep and manage cash, adminis-
trative restrictions in setting up bank accounts at
RBF facilities had to be overcome. This delayed the
initial start of the demand-side component to Sep-
tember 2013 (i.e. six months after the initially
planned launch).Study design
As part of a larger impact evaluation assessing the
effect of the RBF4MNH on MNH service utilization
and quality [24], this study followed a non-randomized
controlled pre-post-test design including 32 of the 33
facilities targeted by the RBF4MNH intervention (we
excluded one facility since it could not be identified as
EmOC given lack of a delivery ward at baseline). The
18 facilities empanelled during the early phase served
as ‘interventions’. Of the remaining 14 control facilities,
five turned into RBF facilities at the start of the expan-
sion phase and were treated as ‘switchers’. Data were
collected at three time points: baseline (April–May
2013, before official program launch), midterm (June–
July 2014, approximately one year after program
launch) and endline (June–July 2015, approximately
two years after program launch).Study samples and data collection
We used three different samples: a facility sample, a ser-
vice user sample, and an obstetric case sample. During
each survey round, we collected three different sets of
data: a facility inventory, direct case observations, and a
household-level survey.
The facility sample included 32 facilities. During
baseline and midterm this sample consisted of 18 inter-
vention and 14 control facilities, and 25 interventions
and nine controls during endline (after expansion in
October 2014). Selection of interventions followed the
RBF empanelment criteria. Controls included all EmOC
facilities initially not included by the RBF. Facility in-
ventories consisted of a structured checklist collecting
information on availability of operational equipment,
medicines, and supplies essential to routine and basic
emergency obstetric care.
The service user sample included 5509 randomly selected
women living in catchment areas of sampled facilities who
completed a pregnancy within the twelve months preceding
each survey date. Women reporting pregnancies that re-
sulted in foetal loss or demise before the third trimester
were excluded. A two-stage cluster approach was used to
sample eligible women. Structured household-level ques-
tionnaires collected information on women’s demographic
characteristics, health-seeking behaviour during pregnancy,
obstetric care service use at birth, birth outcome, and
household-specific socio-economic.
The obstetric case sample included a total of 383
labouring women who presented to the sampled facil-
ities during the three data collection rounds. Conveni-
ence sampling was used to include only cases without
obstetric complications to ensure comparability be-
tween cases. Case observations consisted of a structured
checklist collecting information on birth attendants’ ad-
herence to clinical standard guidelines during routine
case management. Content was based on performance
standards developed for the Malawi Performance Qual-
ity Improvement program [25]. Observations started
once a labouring woman was admitted to the maternity
unit and lasted up to two hours after delivery.
Outcome variables
We used effective coverage of pregnant women with
facility-based basic obstetric care services as main out-
come variables and defined it according to the literature
[11, 12, 26] as ECFBD preg =UFBD preg ∣ NFBD preg ∗QFBD preg
representing effective coverage (EC) of pregnant women
(preg) using facility-based delivery services (FBD) at a des-
ignated EmOC facility (U) providing a given level of qual-
ity (Q). Here, UFBD preg ∣ NFBD preg denotes FBD service
use conditional on true need for basic EmOC (i.e. crude
or contact coverage) and defined it as any woman carrying
a pregnancy beyond the second trimester [27, 28]. We
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women who used services at any of the designated
EmOC facilities included in our sample (vs. non-
facility-based care or facility-based care at a non-
EmOC facilities). To determine the expected quality of
care received by a woman using FBD services at a
given facility, we created a composite score using a
content-of-care approach measuring the extent to
which obstetric care was provided in adherence with
pertinent standards of care based on a combination of
input and process indicators taken from the inventor-
ies and case observations. In developing the composite
score, we followed a standard approach including
weighting, aggregation and uncertainty analysis [29].
A detailed outline of this approach and the underlying
indicator mapping is provided in the additional files
[see Additional file 1 and Additional file 2].
The resulting composite score ranged from 0 (not
meeting any of the measured obstetric care standards) to
1 (meeting all standards). In the entire sample, none of
the studied facilities actually attained a score of 1 (mea-
sured scores were nearly normally distributed with a
range from 0.22 to 0.86, median of 0.56 and mean of
0.55), dichotomous categorization of facilities into ‘ef-
fective’ (i.e. a score of 1) and ‘less than effective’ (i.e. a
score less than 1) was not practical to our analysis. In
addition to only measuring effective coverage as the per-
centage of service use adjusted by the respective quality
score, we further created additional binary variables
based on different cut-off values within the upper range
of the measured scores to assess facilities’ relative
achievements towards these sub-levels. These cut-offs
were set at scores of 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 representing
50%, 60%, 70%, and 80% of full obstetric care effective-
ness. Quality scores were then assigned to each sampled
woman based on reported facility use during the previ-
ous year, assuming short-term changes in service quality
or effectiveness at a given facility to be minimal. Due to
missing data for some facilities, we were not able to de-
termine a quality score for each facility during baseline
and midterm and consequently could not assign quality
information to 141 women, reducing the actual sample
available for analysis to 5368 women.Analytical approach
We use descriptive statistics and two-sample t-test to
compare differences in key characteristics between inter-
ventions and controls for each sample. We used fre-
quencies illustrating the distribution of facilities and
users by quality score categories over time. To estimated
the RBF4MNH impact on crude and effective coverage
we used linear regression in a difference-in-differences
comparison [30]:Y i ¼ β0 þ β1t1i þ β2Ti þ β3t1i  Ti þ β4t2i þ β5t2i  Ti
þβkXki þ εit;
with Y
i
representing the outcome (crude or effective
coverage), t the time point (t1 =midterm, t2 = endline),
T the treatment group, and T*t the interaction between
treatment and time point (T1*t1 interaction at midterm,
T*t2 at endline). Coefficients β3 and β5 represent the ef-
fect estimates at midterm and endline, respectively.
Models were further adjusted for potential con-
founders (denoted by βkXki): household characteristics
(district location, distance to nearest EmOC, socioeco-
nomic status) when modelling effects on both crude and
effective coverage; additional facility characteristics (type,
ownership) when modelling effects on effective coverage.
Household socio-economic status was measured as a
relative wealth index based on assets and living condi-
tions using principal component analysis and described
in detail elsewhere [31]. We also adjusted for clustering
at catchment area level and for the late phase expansion
with five initial control facilities switching treatment
arms. Given the relatively small number of catchment
area clusters we used bootstrapping to improve the ac-
curacy of standard errors for our effect estimates. Given
the limitations of our clustered study design, we were
only able to detect effect sizes of 0.25 or larger at a sig-
nificance level of 5%. STATA version 14.1 was used for
all statistical analyses.
Results
Sample characteristics
Table 1 summarizes distribution and characteristics
for each of the three samples included in the analysis.
Complete information for both facility inventories and
corresponding case observations was available for only
26 facilities at baseline, and for 30 and 32 facilities at
midterm and endline. Across time points, proportions
of health centres and faith-based facilities were higher
in the control arm reflecting the RBF4MNH’s mandate
to contract primarily public facilities, including the
four district hospitals. For the remaining 5368 women
sample sizes differed greatly between study arms
reflecting the oversampling of district hospital catch-
ment areas in the intervention group. Statistically sig-
nificant differences in two-sample t-tests between
group means existed for household socioeconomic sta-
tus (p = 0.01 at baseline), with women in the interven-
tion arm on average residing in poorer households.
Between 88.6 and 97.0% of women depending on study
arm and time point reported facility-based service use,
while delivery at any or at catchment area specific
EmOC facilities was much lower.
Table 1 Distributions and characteristics of sampled facilities, observed cases, and surveyed women
Study arm Baseline Midterm Endline
Sampled facilities
Sample sizes, n (%) Intervention 17 (100) 18 (100) 23 (100)
Control 9 (100) 12 (100) 9 (100)
Proportion of health centres
(i.e. not hospitals), n (%)
Intervention 13 (76) 14 (78) 18 (78)
Control 8 (98) 11 (92) 9 (100)
Proportion of public facilities (i.e. not private non-
profit), n (%)
Intervention 16 (94) 17 (94) 19 (83)
Control 6 (67) 6 (50) 6 (67)
Sampled obstetric cases
Sample sizes, n (%) Intervention 61 (100) 106 (100) 131 (100)
Control 19 (100) 51 (100) 18 (100)
Observed at health centres, n (%) Intervention 27 (44) 51 (48) 69 (47)
Control 8 (89) 45 (88) 18 (100)
Observed at public facilities, n (%) Intervention 57 (93) 103 (97) 116 (89)
Control 12 (63) 21 (41) 11 (61)
Sampled women p-value* p-value* p-value*
Sample sizes, n (%) Intervention 1084 (100) 1141 (100) 1380 (100)
Control 628 (100) 695 (100) 440 (100)
Women’s age in years, mean (SD) Intervention 25.5 (6.3) 25.1 (6.1) 25.2 (6.4)
Control 25.8 (6.4) 0.41 25.0 (5.9) 0.64 25.5 (6.3) 0.35
Parity in number of births, mean (SD) Intervention 3.3 (2.2) 2.9 (1.9) 3.0 (2.0)
Control 3.3 (2.1) 0.58 3.0 (1.9) 0.87 3.0 (1.9) 0.94
Distance in km to catchment EmOC facility, mean
(SD)
Intervention 5.8 (3.4) 5.7 (3.7) 5.5 (3.5)
Control 5.6 (3.3) 0.28 5.5 (3.0) 0.32 5.5 (3.2) 0.96
Household SES by wealth quintilea, mean (SD) Intervention 2.9 (1.4) 2.9 (1.5) 2.9 (1.4)
Control 3.1 (1.4) 0.01 3.1 (1.3) 0.10 3.2 (1.4) < 0.01
Service use at any facility including non-EmOCb, %
(95-CI)
Intervention 90.6 (86.3—93.6) 94.1 (91.8—95.8) 94.2 (91.9—95.9)
Control 88.6 (81.6—93.2) 0.53 97.0 (94.7—98.3) 0.03 96.8 (93.7—98.4) 0.05
Service use at an EmOC facility in study areab, %
(95-CI)
Intervention 75.4 (65.7—83.1) 79.2 (69.9—86.2) 78.7 (69.9—85.5)
Control 66.2 (47.0—81.3) 0.32 73.8 (56.6—85.9) 0.49 64.0 (41.5—81.7) 0.14
Service use at catchment EmOC facility b, % (95-CI) Intervention 60.3 (46.8—72.4) 65.2 (52.8—75.9) 65.4 (54.2—75.2)
Control 40.6 (24.3—59.3) .07 45.0 (28.5—62.8) .05 38.5 (22.7—57.2) .01
EmOC = emergency obstetric care, 95-CI = 95%-confidence interval, n = total number, SD = standard deviations, SES = socio-economic status;
aquintile 1 = least wealthy, quintile 5 = most wealthy
bconfidence intervals adjusted for clustered sampling at catchment area level
*p-values based on two-sample t-test
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As shown in Table 2, facilities scored on average rela-
tively low when assessed against the standards included
in our composite. While we observed a continuous in-
crease over time in intervention facilities (from an aver-
age score of 0.55 to 0.65), scores in control facilities
showed an increase only at midterm (from 0.56 to
0.60), but then dropped below the baseline value at
endline. As for the different score levels, more than half
of facilities in each study arm reached the 0.5 cut-off(i.e. at least 50% of service effectiveness) at baseline,
with more than three-quarters of intervention facilities
reaching this cut-off at endline compared to only about
two-thirds of controls. About one third of control and
even fewer intervention facilities reached the 0.6 cut-off
at baseline. While more than half of intervention facil-
ities eventually reached this level at endline, there was
no further improvement observed in controls over
time. Only single facilities (control) or none (interven-
tion) reached the 0.7 and 0.8 cut-off scores at baseline,
Table 2 Obstetric care quality score and distribution of EmOC facilities by score categories
Measured quality scores Study arm Baseline Midterm Endline
Total composite score, mean (SD) Intervention 0.55 (0.12) 0.63 (0.12) 0.65 (0.13)
Control 0.56 (0.18) 0.60 (0.11) 0.53 (0.13)
Facilities with a score of 0.5 or higher, n (%) Intervention 10 (58.8) 14 (77.8) 18 (78.3)
Control 5 (55.6) 9 (75.0) 6 (66.7)
Facilities with a score of 0.6 or higher, n (%) Intervention 3 (17.7) 7 (38.9) 13 (56.5)
Control 3 (33.3) 4 (33.3) 1 (11.1)
Facilities with a score of 0.7 or higher, n (%)1. Intervention 0 (0.0) 3 (16.7) 3 (13.0)
Control 1 (11.1) 1 (8.3) 1 (11.1)
Facilities with a score of 0.8 or higher, n (%) Intervention 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Control 1 (11.1) 0 (0.0) 1 (11.1)
SD = standard deviation, 95-CI = 95%-confidence interval, n = total number, % = percentage
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vention facilities. Further details on sub-scores for each of
the twelve quality categories included in the composite
are provided in an additional file [see Additional file 1].
Table 3 outlines the proportion of pregnant women
using services at EmOC facilities in relation to the ob-
served obstetric quality score. At baseline, most women
ended up using facilities with a score of 0.59 points or
less (75.4% combined in interventions areas, 62.3% com-
bined in controls). At endline, the larger proportions of
pregnant women in intervention areas used services at
facilities with scores between 0.60 and 0.79 points (com-
bined 84.1%), compared to control areas where the lar-
ger proportion of women used facilities scoring between
0.50 and 0.69 points (combined 72.6%).Table 3 Women seeking care at any designated EmOC facility by
obstetric care quality score (categorized)
Obstetric quality score
of EmOC facility used
Study arm Users of any EmOC service (n/%)
Baseline Midterm Endline
0.00—0.49 points Intervention 218 (26.7) 68 (7.5) 84 (7.7)
Control 131 (31.6) 55 (10.7) 38 (13.5)
0.50—0.59 points Intervention 397 (48.7) 190 (21.0) 87 (8.0)
Control 127 (30.7) 130 (25.3) 113 (40.2)
0.60—0.69 points Intervention 194 (23.8) 426 (47.1) 519 (47.8)
Control 58 (14.0) 231 (45.0) 91 (32.4)
0.70—0.79 points Intervention 0 (0.0) 178 (19.7) 394 (36.3)
Control 48 (11.6) 97 (18.9) 39 (13.9)
0.80—1.0 points Intervention 7 (0.9) 42 (4.7) 2 (0.2)
Control 50 (12.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Total Intervention 816 (100) 904 (100) 1086 (100)
Control 414 (100) 513 (100) 281 (100)
EmOC = emergency obstetric care, 95-CI = 95%-confidence interval, n = total
number, % = percentageTrends in population coverage
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the levels of crude and ef-
fective coverage for each study group (solid bars), as well
as effective coverage for each of the different effective-
ness cut-offs (patterned bars). Crude coverage remained
relatively stable throughout the study period by around
80% in both study arms. In comparison, effective cover-
age at baseline was much lower (43.5% intervention,
45.7% control) and increased in both study arms at mid-
term to about 52%. At endline, effective coverage in con-
trols declined to near baseline levels (46.6%), but
remained elevated in interventions (54.0%). Applying
cut-offs at different effectiveness levels, coverage trends
were parallel with increases between baseline and mid-
term for intervention and controls at a 50% cut-off, but
remained stable between midterm and endline. At a 60%
cut-off, effective coverage trends were parallel between
baseline and midterm and diverged between midterm
and endline due to further increases in interventions
and a drop in controls. At a 70% cut-off, an effective
coverage upward trend between baseline and midterm
occurred only in the intervention arm, with a continuous
downward trend in the control arm. At an 80% cut-off,
effective coverage remained extremely low for both
study arms and was absent at endline.Effects on population coverage
Table 4 presents the effect estimate attributable to the
RBF4MNH intervention modelled by our difference-in-
differences analysis both at midterm (β3) and endline
(β6). Effects of the RBF4MNH on crude coverage were
initially negative, but slightly positive later on at endline,
however, in both instances without statistical significance
(p = 0.28 and 0.83, respectively). Effects on effective
coverage in comparison were positive, but statistically
non-significant, both at midterm (4.7%-points, p = 0.13)
Fig. 1 Time trends of crude and effective coverage (without and with cut-off levels applied). Data based on descriptive non-adjusted analysis
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effects on effective coverage were only minimal and sta-
tistically non-significant. At higher cut-offs, effect sizes
were positive and relatively large, with a statistically sig-
nificant increase of 31.1%-points (p = 0.02) between at
endline for the 60% and of 25.8%-points (p = 0.04) atTable 4 RBF4MNH impact on crude and effective obstetric care cov
Outcome Estimate
Crude coverage β3 (baseline vs. midterm)
β5 (baseline vs. endline)
Effective coverage (no cut-off) β3 (baseline vs. midterm)
β5 (baseline vs. endline)
Effective coverage (50% cut-off) β3 (baseline vs. midterm)
β5 (baseline vs. endline)
Effective coverage (60% cut-off) β3 (baseline vs. midterm)
β5 (baseline vs. endline)
Effective coverage (70% cut-off) β3 (baseline vs. midterm)
β5 (baseline vs. endline)
Effective coverage (80% cut-off) β3 (baseline vs. midterm)
β5 (baseline vs. endline)
EmOC = emergency obstetric care, β3 = coefficient for effect estimate at midterm, β5 =
aCrude coverage estimates adjusted for district, distance to nearest EmOC, socioeconom
and ownershipmidterm for the 70% cut-off. At the 80% cut-off, effects
remained positive, but statistically non-significant.
Discussion
To date, this is the first study assessing the impact of a
RBF program on effective coverage. Our findingserage (adjusted analysisa)
Effect size (%-points) 95%-confidence interval p-value
−4.3 −11.2—3.4 0.28
1.2 −10.0—11.8 0.83
4.7 −1.4—10.8 0.13
7.1 −0.1—15.0 0.07
1.7 −22.2—25.7 0.89
−1.9 −28.6—24.8 0.89
21.1 −8.1—50.3 0.16
31.0 5.9—56.2 0.02
25.8 1.3—50.4 0.04
16.4 −7.9—40.8 0.19
13.1 −8.7—43.9 0.24
10.5 −10.8—31.8 0.33
coefficient for effect estimate at endline
ic status; effective coverage estimates in addition also adjusted for facility type
Brenner et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2018) 18:791 Page 8 of 10indicate that the RBF4MNH improved effective coverage
of pregnant women with facility-based obstetric care by
about 7%-points after a two-year implementation period.
Defining effectiveness by different quality cut-offs, our
analysis further demonstrated that this impact was great-
est (31%-point increase) once service effectiveness was
defined as meeting at least 60% of the measured quality
score. While use of obstetric care services (crude cover-
age) remained relatively unchanged, a higher proportion
of women received higher quality services over time, al-
though none of the studied facilities met all aspects of
the quality of care measured by our score.
In LMIC contexts, RBF programs are not only seen as
provider payment mechanisms but also as a driver for
wider health care reforms addressing good governance,
autonomy, competition, and separation of health finan-
cing functions [32]. Unlike many other RBF schemes in
LMIC, which address a wide range of primary care ser-
vices, the RBF4MNH kept an explicit focus on obstetric
care only, and thus might not be fully comparable with
other broader RBF programs. While the RBF4MNH im-
proved quality of care (Table 1), thus allowing more
women to attend services of higher quality in general
(Table 3), this rather vertical implementation approach
might have been less effective in addressing some of the
underlying cross-cutting service delivery deficits in the
country. Still, the RBF4MNH motivated health workers
and management teams to take more responsibility and
accountability in their strategic decision-making [33].
Given the relatively short evaluation period of about
two years, the observed improvement in service quality by
0.1 points in intervention facilities is quite remarkable, but
probably not sufficiently satisfying in light of the rather
low scores observed at baseline (around 0.55). Although
not validated, we feel confident that in developing this
score using a content-of-care approach, we took sufficient
precautions in both indicator selection and composite
construction to adequately reflect the current standards
and guidelines related to obstetric care provision in our
study context beyond the programs performance focus.
Thus, we consider the improvement in the score to point
at wider quality of care deficits not yet sufficiently ad-
dressed by the RBF4MNH program, such as challenges re-
lated to central supply-chain management, the wider
aspects related to the skilled health worker shortages, or
Malawi’s declining economic situation.
Given these wider deficits in relation to health service
delivery, the large positive net effects on effective
coverage (20–30%-points) achieved at 60% and 70%
cut-off levels are nevertheless a demonstration of the
RBF4MNH’s potential to introduce improvements to-
wards more effective service provision and coverage.
However, these effects may have partly resulted from
the initial RBF4MNH assignment in favour of morefunctional facilities. The initial upgrades (i.e. non-
conditional inputs) prior to study begin might also have
likely contributed to the observed effects, however,
this component was considered an integrated part of
the RBF4MNH implementation design and was thus
evaluated accordingly. Our analytical approach, unfor-
tunately, did not allow further discerning of the effects
of upgrades from those produced by the performance
payments alone.
Another reason explaining the larger effects observed at
60% and 70% effectiveness cut-offs compared to higher
levels might be the relative short study period of about
two years, of which the first 18 months were characterized
by programmatic changes. It is therefore plausible to as-
sume that the RBF4MNH reached full functionality only
once the expansion phase started. Introduction of new
purchasing structures in a healthcare setting with little
antecedents in setting performance targets, service price
negotiations, performance documentation and verifica-
tion, or distribution and investment of rewards by pro-
viders seemingly requires a wider timeframe than the
one feasible for this evaluation [34], and limited the ex-
tent to which our study was able to assess the full effect
of the program.
Evidence from other RBF programs in LMIC suggests
the necessity of demand-side components in redirecting
women’s choice in place of delivery [9, 10]. However, we
observed no substantial effects on crude coverage in this
study. We attribute this to the initially relatively con-
strained incentives towards service use (demand-side
component was only fully implemented during the expan-
sion phase) and the fact that crude coverage was rather
high already at baseline. In light of the relatively low ob-
stetric quality observed for many facilities, a phase-in of
the demand-side after successful supply-side implementa-
tion should probably have been preferential from an eth-
ical point of view, in order to limit the extent to which
women are directed to use services that provide substan-
tially lower quality or ineffective care.
Our study has limitations. First, as already men-
tioned, the two-year study period might have been too
short to assess the full impact of the scheme, consider-
ing the general scope of RBF schemes to not only
change reimbursement structures, but concomitantly
introduce a set of new management and decision-
making processes. Second, in absence of randomized
assignment of facilities to the RBF, our study remained
limited to a quasi-experimental design. With only one
observation point available prior to intervention start
we failed to test the parallel trend assumption under-
lying the difference-in-differences method, with our
effect estimates being more conservative and likely
underestimating the true effect of the intervention.
Third, selection of control facilities had to be limited
Brenner et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2018) 18:791 Page 9 of 10to the four intervention districts. RBF4MNH incen-
tives were not only provided to assigned facilities, but
also to each DHMT targeting district-wide activities
(e.g. supervisory visits, supply-chain management) for
the benefit of all facilities in a district (including our
controls). This might have contaminated our measures
on service effectiveness in the control arm underesti-
mating the overall RBF4MNH effects observed. Lastly,
the content-of-care approach underlying our compos-
ite score does not account for wider aspects of health-
care quality, such as patient satisfaction or actual
mortality reduction [11]. We therefore cannot make
any assumptions of the RBF4MNH’s effect on ele-
ments of effectiveness other than clinical care quality.Conclusion
Despite these limitations, our study was able to demon-
strate that the RBF4MNH program improved effective
coverage of pregnant women by improving service quality
and allowing a larger proportion of women to receive
more effective care in the context of Malawi. We consider
our findings as evidence that RBF programs have the po-
tential to address effective coverage and thus can play a
role in LMIC’s progression towards UHC. To gain further
understanding on the true potential of RBF schemes on
both service and population coverage, we therefore sug-
gest a wider use of effective coverage measures in the
evaluation of RBF programs, especially in LMICs.Additional files
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